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Abstract 
The stakes for alleviating poverty and avoiding unbridled climate change are inextricably 
linked. Climate change impacts will slow down and may even reverse trends in poverty 
reduction. The pathways consistent with global warming of no more than 2°C require 
strategies for poverty alleviation to make allowance for the constraint of low-carbon 
development. Existing climate funds have failed to target poverty alleviation as a high-
priority strategy for adaptation or as a component of low-carbon development. This article 
proposes a funding window as part of the Green Climate Fund in order to foster synergies 
targeting greater satisfaction of basic needs, while making allowance for adaptation and 
mitigation. This financial mechanism is based on indicators of the satisfaction of basic needs 
and could respond to the claims of the developing countries which see alleviating poverty as 
the first priority in the climate negotiations. It defines a country continuum, given that there 
are poor people everywhere; all developing countries are therefore eligible with a 
mechanism of this sort. 
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Policy relevance statement 
The IPCC calls for substantial emissions reductions and adaptation strategies over the next 
decades to reduce the high risks of severe impacts of climate change over the 21st century. 
Industrialized countries and developing countries alike recognize the need to mitigate 
climate change and to adapt to it. But they face many challenges that lead to an “emissions 
gap” between an emissions level consistent with the 2° C increase limit and the voluntary 
pledges that they have made thus far in the climate negotiations (UNEP, 2014). In this arena, 
many developing countries underline that their first domestic priority is the satisfaction of 
basic needs. In the run-up to the next climate negotiations at COP 21 in Paris, the proposed 
Poverty-Adaptation-Mitigation-funding window could contribute to alleviate the conflict 
between development and climate goals in developing countries. In this sense, it could spur 
developing countries to integrate more ambitious emissions limitations pledges into their 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. This could in turn entice industrialized 
countries to act similarly. In the end, it could pave the way to an ambitious climate 
agreement in Paris at COP21. 
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Introduction 
 
The year 2015 will see two major international events: negotiations to set new Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) with the reaffirmed goal of ending extreme poverty, and the 21st 
International Conference on Climate Change (COP21). The coincidence of these two events 
recalls how poverty and climate change, two major challenges for the coming decades, are 
intertwined.  
Despite substantial progress in reducing extreme poverty rates in developing regions over 
the last 20 years, from 47 % of the population in 1990 to 22 % in 2014, 1.2 billion people still 
live with less than $1.25 a day : 400 million in India, 400 million in sub-Saharan Africa, 150 
million in China (UNDP, 2014; UNECA et al., 2014). Poverty goes hand-in-hand with large-
scale failures to satisfy several basic needs: 840 million people in the world suffer from 
hunger; 2.5 billion lack access to improved sanitation facilities; 863 million urban residents 
live in slums (UN-Habitat, 2013); worldwide, 2.7 billion people use biomass to cook their 
food, with devastating effects on their health (IEA, 2011); in sub-Saharan Africa, only 32% of 
the population has access to electricity (59% in towns and only 16% in rural areas); in India 
the figure is 75% (IEA, 2014). 
Climate change is very likely to be a major hurdle to the eradication of poverty (Skoufias et 
al., 2011; Shepherd et al., 2013). Climate change will not only worsen the situation of the 
poor; it will also very likely reverse the trend of decreasing poverty (Hallegatte et al., 2014). 
Therefore, to limit overall climate change impacts and particularly on the poorest 
populations, global warming has to be limited to 2°C at most. This means, according to IPCC 
(IPCC, 2014), that the world’s population must become carbon neutral by the end of the 21st 
century. Development strategies including poverty eradication will thus need to integrate 
mitigation strategies. However poverty alleviation usually induces an enlargement of basic 
needs which may lead to a very high growth in energy services and consumption: for 
example when people get access to modern energy, their energy consumption tends to rise 
rapidly above the very low, initial level (Wolfram et al., 2012; Gertler et al., 2011). It is thus 
important that pro-poor policies are designed in such a way as to be consistent with climate 
mitigation, which is possible according to Hallegatte et al. (2014).  
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In spite of these inextricable links between climate change and poverty, until the early -
2000s international forums generally addressed the two challenges separately. Policies and 
strategies to achieve the Millennium Development Goals focused mainly on ‘development-
first’ actions (UN, 2005); international climate negotiations dealt with ‘climate (mitigation) 
first’ issues, even if many developing countries repeatedly pointed that other more urgent 
issues, including poverty eradication were on their agendas (Kasa et al, 2008 ; Rajamani, 
2007)1. 
The intertwined issues of development and climate change gained considerable momentum 
by the mid-2000s. Following Beg et al. (2002), and Winkler et al. (2002), Bradley et al. (2005) 
further investigated Sustainable Development-Policies and measures (SD-PAMs), putting 
domestic development policies first while having a positive effect on GHG emissions.  
Similarly, Halsnæs and Garg (2006) suggested to build climate policies around development 
priorities and considered the potential contribution to mitigation by developing countries as 
a side-benefit of sustainable development.  
The fourth IPCC assessment report reviewed the literature on ‘the two-way nature of the 
relationship between climate change (mitigation) and sustainable development’ (IPCC, 
2007b, p. 695): actions limiting GHG emissions may generate development co-benefits, while 
well-tailored sustainable development strategies may contribute to climate mitigation. 
A triangular relationship has even formed between climate change and sustainable 
development since the mid-2000s, with climate-change negotiations increasingly addressing 
concerns about adaptation as well as mitigation. The fourth IPCC assessment report 
emphasized the inter-relationship between climate adaptation and mitigation (IPCC, 2007a). 
Clapp et al. (2010) suggested low-emissions development strategies (LEDS) which integrate 
mitigation and/or climate-resilient policies. These LEDS were incorporated in the 2009 
Copenhagen Accord and the 2010 Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2009, 2010). Since COP 19 
in Warsaw the scope of international negotiation has evolved in such a way that the Parties 
at COP 21 will negotiate on the basis of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(UNFCCC, 2013). In this context national research teams of the Deep Decarbonization 
                                                     
1 It is worth noting that, among the G77+China Group, the Small Island Developing States and the Least 
Developed Countries did not and still do not share this position as they are the countries most exposed to 
climate-change impacts: they strongly advocate a 1.5 °C maximum temperature increase (IIED, 2014). 
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Pathways Project (DDPP) work on illustrative pathways for the transition to a low-carbon 
economy.  In their scenarios, teams from developing countries such as India (Mathur et al., 
2014), South Africa (Trollip et al., 2014) and Indonesia (Siagian et al., 2014) emphasize the 
need for poverty alleviation as the highest priority. This objective is translated in each of 
these national energy scenarios into a 100% access to modern energy in the next decades. 
Given the service life of infrastructure and facilities, it is essential that all the resources 
devoted to alleviating poverty should include a dual carbon and climate constraint. In other 
words, just as the battle against climate change can only be stepped up if it makes allowance 
for the imperatives of development and alleviating poverty, so development strategies must 
integrate a decarbonized approach and adaptation to climate-change impacts. It is 
consequently legitimate that international climate negotiations should provide a concrete 
response, in particular on funding mechanisms, to enable and extend efforts to alleviate 
poverty, while integrating the climate constraint in the adaptation and mitigation branches.  
This in turn prompts the need for mechanisms which would drive policies simultaneously 
targeting poverty alleviation, climate adaptation and/or mitigation. Our paper seeks to 
demonstrate the relevance of a Poverty-Adaptation-Mitigation Window (PAM-W) that would 
be implemented within the Green Climate Fund and presents its main features. In the first 
part of the paper we assess the way existing funding sources and climate funds have allowed 
for this dimension, and we highlight the limitations of these approaches. After describing the 
Green Climate Fund, the second part draws on the above appraisal to propose a specific 
funding window for poverty, adaptation and mitigation, in such a way as to target poverty 
alleviation while making allowance for the climate constraint. 
I. The limits of current climate funds in addressing poverty 
Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2010) estimate that for Africa to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals in a climate-resilient manner, it would need 40% more external funding 
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than it would simply to achieve the original goals. This would mean about $100 billion per 
year in 2010-20, compared to $72 billion a year to attain the MDGs2. 
Since they were launched the existing multilateral climate funds3 have collected $3 billion 
for adaptation, a little over twice as much, $6.5 billion, for mitigation excluding REDD4 (the 
Clean Technology Fund alone represents $4.6 billion), and $4.6 billion for REDD mechanisms 
(see Table 1). 
Table 1: Main international climate funds 
 
Funds 
Disbursements 
(M$) up to 
2013 
Administered by Focus 
Implemen
tation 
date 
Main adaptation funds 
Adaptation Fund 406 Adaptation Fund Board Adaptation 2009 
Adaptation for Smallholder 
Agriculture Program 300 
The International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) Adaptation 2012 
Least Developed Countries 
Fund 903 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) Adaptation 2002 
Special Climate Change 
Fund 336 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) Adaptation 2002 
Pilot Program for Climate 
Resilience 973 The World Bank Adaptation 2008 
Total 2919    
Main mitigation funds 
Clean Technology Fund 4599 The World Bank Mitigation 2008 
Global Energy Efficiency 
and Renewable Energy 
Fund 
169 The European Commission Mitigation 2008 
Scaling-Up Renewable 
Energy Program for Low 
Income Countries 
506 The World Bank Mitigation 2009 
GEF Trust Fund – Climate 
Change focal area (GEF 4) 1083 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
Adaptation, 
Mitigation 2006 
                                                     
2 The usual estimates of the cost of achieving the MDGs (UN Millennium project, 2005; Bourguignon et al, 
2008; Ban et al, 2008; Jones et al, 2003) do not include the additional cost of adaptation and the need to cope 
with a hostile climate. 
3 In this part we disregard the Green Climate Fund, currently being operationalized and slated ultimately to 
become the main climate fund. It will be addressed in the second part. 
4 REDD stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
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GEF Trust Fund – Climate 
Change focal area (GEF 6) 192 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
Adaptation, 
Mitigation 2006 
Total 6543    
Main REDD+ funds  
UN-REDD 251  
Mitigation – 
REDD 2009 
Norway's International 
Climate and Forest 
Initiative 1607 
UNDP Mitigation – REDD 2008 
Forest Investment Program 
(FIP) 599 The World Bank 
Mitigation – 
REDD 
The World 
Bank 
Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility - Readiness Fund 
(FCPF-RF) 355 
The World Bank Mitigation – REDD 2008 
Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility - Carbon Fund 
(FCPF-CF) 388 
The World Bank Mitigation – REDD 2008 
Congo Basin Forest Fund 
(CBFF) 186 African Development Bank   
Australia's International 
Forest Carbon Initiative 216    
Amazon Fund 1033 Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES)  2009 
Total 4637    
 
Predictably these funds fall far short of what is needed to keep global warming below the 
2°C limit and provide vulnerable countries with the capacity to adapt. Which is why, 
following the Copenhagen Accord, the industrialized countries set a target of raising $100 
billion a year up to 2020, in order to support mitigation and adaptation actions in developing 
countries. 
Looking beyond these figures we need to examine more closely how combating poverty has 
so far been integrated into existing climate funds. 
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1. How much goes to the poor in the share-out of existing funds? 
a) Adaptation 
There is no single methodology for the resource allocation of existing adaptation funds (Klein 
and Möhner, 2011). 
Several vulnerability indicators have nevertheless been proposed in the literature to ensure 
that adaptation funding targets the countries most exposed to the impacts of climate change 
(Barr et al, 2010; Buys et al, 2009; Füssel, 2010; Wheeler, 2011). But the rankings of 
countries yielded by the various indicators are very divergent (Persson and Remling, 2014).  
Nakhooda et al. (2014) use the global adaptation index GAIN5 to show that the countries 
receiving the most funding for adaptation6 are indeed among those most exposed to 
climate-change impacts. Meanwhile, Stadelmann et al. (2013), or Persson and Remling 
(2014) show that the Adaptation Fund has targeted a small number of countries with both a 
low degree of vulnerability and high per-capita income. 
Some authors are wary of how well aggregate indicators reflect the specific needs of 
countries, given the diversity of adaptive needs (Klein and Persson, 2008). Some actions are 
designed to cope with the direct impacts of climate change, whereas others relate to 
reducing vulnerability arising out of poverty and its associated ills (informal housing, shanty 
towns, use of non-commercial energy sources, lack of sanitation, etc.). So it seems necessary 
to use indicators that are more sector-based, reflecting the reality on the ground more 
accurately (Füssel, 2010), or indeed mechanisms specific to each type of vulnerability 
(Hallegatte, 2011), in order to make combating poverty a strategic priority for adaptation. 
b) Mitigation 
Nakhooda et al. (2014) show that the bulk of funding for mitigation has gone to countries 
which either have a high level of greenhouse-gas emissions or are registering rapid growth in 
this respect. Ten countries received 74% of funding: Mexico and Morocco each received 
more than $500 million, followed by South Africa, India and Indonesia. The Clean Technology 
                                                     
5 The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (GAIN) comprises a vulnerability index for water, food, health, 
housing, ecosystem and infrastructure regarding exposure to climate risks, and a readiness index describing the 
capacity of a country to make use of financial resources for adaptation. See http://index.gain.org 
6 By order of funding: Bangladesh, Niger, Mozambique, Zambia, Cambodia, Nepal, Tajikistan, Samoa, Bolivia 
and Yemen. 
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Fund plays a predominant role here, accounting for about 70% of all mitigation funding. 
Little climate-change mitigation funding has gone to the least developed countries, with a 
total of $203 million being allocated to mitigation (including REDD) in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Nakhooda et al, 2011). These conclusions are reminiscent of the Clean Development 
Mechanism’s lopsided geographical distribution, with projects concentrated in China, India 
and Mexico (Dechezlepretre et al, 2008; Winkelman and Moore, 2011), whereas only 3% of 
the emission-reduction credits were generated in Africa (Röttgers and Grote, 2014). 
These observations reveal the climate-centred side of international negotiations and the 
resulting funding mechanisms. Mitigation-assessment indicators in flexibility mechanisms 
hinge on the tonnes of CO2eq reduction generated. In project mechanisms the tonnes of 
CO2eq reductions are calculated in relation to a baseline scenario (Gillenwater, 2012). This 
approach complicates funding of low-carbon projects by climate funds in the case of 
development and poverty-reduction projects with a very low level of energy services in the 
baseline scenario. 
In the least developed countries, for example, the rate of electrification is low. If the current 
figure was taken as the baseline scenario, it would be difficult to find much scope for cutting 
emissions as electrification progresses, even if generating the additional electricity entails 
limited carbon emissions. It would of course be possible to adopt a methodology developed 
under the CDM to make allowance for suppressed demand. The baseline used in this case is 
the minimum service level for energy, even if it has not yet been reached (UNFCCC, 2014). 
But even here, the emissions abatement achieved by a low-carbon electrification project is 
likely to be very slight, when set against the baseline scenario. 
So there is good cause to ask whether the ‘tonnes of CO2eq reduction’ indicator is suitable 
for assessing ‘low-carbon development’ actions. 
This review of existing climate funds suggests that to guarantee funding for adaptation and 
mitigation actions in the context of poverty, fresh thought is needed about the indicators 
used to select and assess projects and policies for funding. Otherwise the scarcity of 
available resources is likely to leave the poorest populations on the sidelines of climate 
funding. 
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2. Phase out project-based approaches in favour of more ambitious strategies 
In recent years a vast body of literature has questioned the merits of project-based 
approaches for funding climate actions. 
The limitations of a project-based mechanism such as the CDM with regard to its structuring 
effects are all too apparent. Authors have consequently put the accent on sector-based 
approaches (Samaniego and Figueres, 2002) or even proposed funding to support the 
deployment of SD-PAMs (Winkler et al, 2002). 
Firstly, having a large number of small projects entails high transaction costs (Ahonen and 
Hämekoski, 2005; Michaelowa et al, 2003 ; Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005) which jeopardize 
the overall efficiency of funding. Africa is a particularly sensitive area in this respect, with the 
average adaptation project amounting to $4 million, rising to $17 million for mitigation. Out 
of all the 483 projects funded by one of the existing climate funds, only nine amounted to 
more than $50 million (Afful-Koomson, 2014). 
Secondly a host of small schemes will not trigger the paradigm shift required to put these 
countries on climate-change-resilient, low-carbon pathways. Regarding adaptation, the 
project-based approach seems better suited to funding actions addressing the direct impacts 
of climate change, which would not otherwise be carried out (building a dyke for example). 
In contrast, for adaptation needs related to development and poverty issues, adaptation 
strategies can be integrated into development strategies, making it more difficult to evaluate 
the additional cost that would determine the financial support in the case of a  project-based 
approach. 
3. Make programmes attractive to private investors 
One essential issue is to redirect public and private investment to actions compatible with 
development pathways integrating climate-change constraints (Hourcade et al, 2009), or 
quite simply to attract private investors, currently deterred by inadequate institutional 
capacity or serious political instability. To this end, goals must be made more consistent and 
get solid backing at national level. Guivarch and Mathy (2012) have shown that in India 
institutional shortcomings and cross subsidies for electricity tariffs, set up in the name of the 
right of access to electricity, constitute a major hindrance to broadening access to power. In 
this context tariff reform, combined with a large scale energy-efficiency drive and support 
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for renewable energies (by feed-in tariffs, for example), would substantially improve the 
financial situation of the energy sector, make various low-carbon investments profitable, and 
broaden access to energy. Support for rolling out such policies may make it easier to 
mobilize the private sector, at least in some countries and regions (Bhaghat, 2012). The task 
may be more difficult elsewhere. In Africa, private funding only accounted for $5 million, out 
of the existing climate funds which raised a total of $3.5 billion (allocated but not paid) 
between 2003 and 2013. To remedy this situation Afful-Koomson (2014) stresses the need to 
enhance the ability of African countries to set up funding bodies and business models which 
secure funding by private investors, with the guarantee of lower risks and adequate rates of 
return. Having said that, over and above the need to mobilize the private sector, it is also 
necessary to encourage co-funding drawing on official development assistance, public 
domestic funds and climate funds. 
So, existing climate funds are ill suited to fostering the necessary synergies between poverty 
reduction, adaptation and mitigation. In the second part of this paper we propose setting up 
a poverty-adaptation-mitigation window as part of the Green Climate Fund. This would 
overcome the obstacles discussed above and contribute to building synergies. 
II. For the creation of a poverty-adaptation-mitigation funding window as 
part of the Green Climate Fund 
In the following we shall describe the modalities for making the as yet not fully defined 
Green Climate Fund operational, then show how a poverty-adaptation-mitigation funding 
window (PAM-W) could fit into this framework. 
1. Features of the Green Climate Fund 
The Green Climate Fund originated in the Copenhagen Accord in 2009. The following year 
the Cancun Conference endorsed its creation. The fund aims to promote a paradigm shift to 
low-carbon, climate-change-resilient development pathways. It is set to become the world’s 
main climate fund (GCF, 2011, §32) and thus one of the prime channels for delivering the 
$100 billion a year promised by the industrialized nations at Copenhagen. These funds would 
be allocated to developing countries, from 2020 onwards, for adaptation, emissions 
abatement (including REDD+), development, technology transfer, and capacity building. By 
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the end of 2014 the fund had collected $14.4 billion and it should be in a position to fund its 
first actions during the second half of 2015. Resources should be equally divided between 
adaptation and mitigation, but the timeframe governed by this rule has yet to be 
determined. A Private Sector Facility (PSF) has been set up to encourage private 
participation, but the facility’s share in the GCF has not been settled7. Other thematic 
funding windows could be established in the future (GCF, 2014a). Achieving a balanced 
share-out, in geographical terms, is also a priority, with among others, the goal of not 
sidelining the least developed countries. This is a sensitive issue. At the sixth meeting of the 
GCF Board China and India opposed an initial proposal to place a 5% cap on funds allocated 
to any one country. The question of setting a minimum funding rate dedicated to the least 
developed countries was also raised. 
a) Country ownership of actions and modalities of access 
To encourage countries to appropriate projects, the fund will only finance actions in 
countries which do not object to them (GCF, 2014b). The fund provides for direct access 
through national, sub-national or regional bodies in addition to international access through 
international funding agencies and to access through the PSF for local and private financial 
intermediaries (GCF, 2014c): 
These two points – the no-objection procedure and direct access – are two key components 
for ensuring that developing countries keep control over actions and funding bodies do not 
dictate their own conditions or programmes, as may have happened in the past (Nakhooda 
et al, 2014). However direct access assumes that national bodies in each country are 
accredited, which is not currently the case, although their number has substantially 
increased in recent years, with for example the Bangladeshi Climate Change Resilience Fund, 
the Brazilian Amazon Fund or the Ethiopian Climate Resilient Green Economy Facility. 
b) Measuring performance 
A results-management framework has been developed, underpinned by performance-
measurement matrices, thanks to which the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of funding 
will be assessed. For mitigation the main impact metric is GHG emissions reduction (in 
tCO2eq), which again raises the question of this indicator’s relevance for assessing the 
                                                     
7 The financial weight, or even the existence, of the Private Sector Facility is open to controversy, some 
developing countries seeing it as a way for industrialized countries to dodge their funding commitments. 
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performance of some low-carbon development projects, as discussed above. As for 
adaptation, the number of beneficiaries is the main impact metric. 
c) Selecting actions 
Six selection criteria have been set, without any indication of their relative weights (GCF, 
2014d): the impact potential relative to the sustainable development and climate objectives 
of the Fund; the paradigm shift potential toward low-carbon and climate-resilient pathways; 
the financing needs of the beneficiary country; the capacity of the beneficiary country to 
implement policies; the economic efficiency of the funds delivered; financial viability (for 
revenue-generating activities). 
The indicators to be used for each of these criteria have yet to be decided. For mitigation, if 
the first criterion is assessed on the basis of emissions reductions (in tCO2eq) compared with 
a baseline scenario, it will run into the problems discussed above with regard to low-carbon 
development projects in which a baseline scenario contains few GHG emissions. In the case 
of adaptation, if the indicator is the number of beneficiaries, that may be consistent with 
poverty-reduction goals. As for the third criterion, bearing in mind the first part of our paper, 
it would jeopardize the poorest countries to select an aggregate indicator, as it would give a 
poor reflection of real conditions in the country, in particular the degree of satisfaction of 
the basic needs of a large share of the population. 
2. Suggested features of the PAM-W 
The Green Climate Fund has not provided for a specific facility for simultaneously targeting 
the triple issue of poverty, adaptation and mitigation. The only features are scope for putting 
a X% cap on the share of GCF resources allocated to any one country (e.g. 5%) or indeed 
directing X% of resources to the least developed countries. In the following we propose to 
create a special funding window, within the GCF, dedicated to the links between poverty, 
adaptation and mitigation (PAM-W), supplementing the funding windows for adaptation and 
mitigation.  
a) Building synergies between poverty-reduction, adaptation and mitigation 
The proposed mechanism aims to build synergies between poverty-reduction, adaptation 
and mitigation in such a way as to pool efforts and ensure that infrastructure and facilities 
developed under the mechanism are both climate-change resilient and contribute to low-
14 
 
carbon development. This will avoid the need to phase out facilities before the end of their 
service life because they made little or no allowance for all the adaptation and emissions 
constraints. Typical actions potentially concerned by such a mechanism would include 
building homes to reduce the number of people living in slums, and integrating bioclimatic 
building techniques, suited to changing climate conditions but also entailing low energy 
consumption and GHG emissions. Examples may be grouped in relation to basic needs as 
shown in table 2. 
Table 2: Sectoral convergence between satisfaction of basic needs, adaptation and 
mitigation. Examples of possible criteria for setting priorities when allocating PAM-W 
resources. 
 
Poverty-
reduction goal 
GHG-reduction 
goal 
Adaptation goal Example of 
action 
Eligibility and 
allocation criteria 
Ho
us
in
g 
Reduce number 
of people living in 
slums 
Limit GHG 
emissions from 
new housing 
Reduce exposure 
to extreme 
events 
Promote 
bioclimatic 
building 
techniques 
Weighting (Number of 
people in country 
living in slums, overall 
population) 
Fo
od
 
Reduce number 
of people 
suffering from 
malnutrition 
Limit GHG 
emissions from 
agriculture 
Reduce 
vulnerability  of 
agriculture to 
climate change 
Improve 
agricultural 
efficiency from 
farm to fork 
Weighting (Number of 
people in country 
suffering from 
malnutrition, overall 
population) 
El
ec
tr
ic
ity
 
Reduce number 
of people 
without 
electricity 
Limit GHG 
emissions from 
electricity 
generation  
Contribute to 
resilience of 
electricity sector 
Develop 
decarbonized 
electricity 
generation and 
energy efficiency 
Weighting (Number of 
people in country 
without electricity, 
overall population) 
W
as
te
 
Reduce pollution, 
increase rate of 
waste processing 
Limit GHG 
emissions from 
waste 
Limit health 
impacts of badly 
managed waste 
in the context of 
climate change 
Waste-gas 
capture facilities 
Weighting (Number of 
people in country 
exposed to severe 
pollution, overall 
population) 
Sa
ni
ta
tio
n 
Reduce number 
of people 
without 
sanitation 
Limit GHG 
emissions from 
effluents 
Limit exposure to 
flooding and/or 
epidemics 
(extreme events) 
Develop efficient 
or improved 
sewerage 
networks 
Weighting (Number of 
people in country 
without sanitation, 
overall population) 
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Tr
an
sp
or
t 
Broaden access 
to mobility and 
improve public 
health in cities 
Limit GHG 
emissions from 
vehicles 
Build climate-
resilient 
infrastructure 
Public transport 
networks, soft 
mobility modes 
Weighting (Number of 
people in country 
without access to 
enhanced mobility, 
overall population) 
He
al
th
 
Improve public 
health and 
broaden access 
to treatment 
- Limit exposure to 
epidemics and 
extreme events 
Increase rate of 
healthcare 
coverage 
Weighting (Number of 
people in country 
without access to 
healthcare, overall 
population) 
 
b) Criteria reflecting satisfaction of basic needs for allocation and assessment 
Under the PAM-W, allocation would target countries which fall far short of satisfying basic 
needs. To this end we propose to select sector-based, national criteria, specific to each need. 
This responds in part to the objections raised by Füssel (2010), and Klein and Möhner (2011) 
regarding the limitations inherent in defining a single aggregate vulnerability indicator. 
Several separate indicators may be more suitable, making it possible to define a set of 
diverse situations more accurately. 
In order to avoid allocating a large share of funding to a few highly populated countries (for 
example, a quarter of the population of India [400 million people] have no access to 
electricity; at the same time some countries in sub-Saharan Africa have only very limited 
access to modern energy sources, but have a smaller overall population) the fund allocation 
criterion should weight the degree of failure to satisfy a basic need for each sector and the 
overall population. 
The goal of the PAM-W, and consequently of its ex post assessment criterion, is to maximize 
the number of people for whom a basic need will be satisfied, subject to the conditions of 
PAM-W eligibility, in other words making allowance for adaptation and/or low-carbon 
development concerns. 
Resorting to this sort of criteria answers the concern of developing countries that priority 
should be given to combating poverty. The other merit of these criteria is that they are 
complementary (Stadelmann et al, 2013) for assessing the equity with which resources are 
allocated but also the efficiency of an action, in the sense that it effectively reduces the 
symptoms of poverty. 
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c) Levels of aid 
The levels of aid provided by funding will be determined by a sector-based approach to each 
type of basic need, in order to establish international benchmarks. The first step would be to 
determine the cost of satisfying these basic needs for each sector: per capita cost of access 
to electricity, to improved sanitation, to waste management, and so on. The Camdessus 
report (2003) estimated that providing 19 million people living in rural areas of Africa with 
access to drinking water and a sewage network would cost $1.4 billion a year from 2003 to 
2010. If this estimate was selected for all the countries, then for each additional person 
gaining access to these services, a country would receive $74 wholly or in part. Similarly, 
according to the International Energy Agency (2011, p.3), “to provide universal modern 
energy access by 2030 annual average investment needs to average $48 billion per year, 
more than five times the level of 2009”. The same report asserts that electrification alone 
would require an investment of between $550 and $740 per person, depending on the type 
of access (on-grid, mini-grid or off-grid). Returns on experience from the existing climate 
funds and the Clean Development Mechanism also enable us to estimate the surplus cost 
entailed by carbon-free technology. 
The share of this cost covered by the PAM-W would depend on several factors: 
i) The overall envelope allocated to the funding window; 
ii) For projects including mitigation, the level of aid should be sufficient, over and 
above other funding and aid, to take charge of any excess cost arising out of the 
use of carbon-free or low-carbon technology ; 
iii) For projects including adaptation, the PAM-W would cover all or part of funding, 
depending on whether climate change is the main reason for the action, or one 
among several; 
iv) The aid ratios for the adaptation branch and the mitigation branch will be added 
up. 
By adopting this approach the mitigation branch would no longer need to debate baseline 
scenarios and would limit transaction costs. The negotiations to set the ratios are 
nevertheless likely to be difficult. They should be carried out in consultation with developing 
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countries and will entail adapting all the ratios to reflect the specific conditions in each 
country. 
d) Payments based on results 
Scope for the PAM-W being partly supported by results-based payments should be 
investigated, in particular with a view to direct access to funding by a national entity8. The 
aim of this approach is to make payment of all or part of funding conditional on achieving 
targets. For this purpose a framework for assessing and monitoring results will need to be 
deployed, underpinning an array of appropriate performance indicators (GCF, 2011, §58). 
This type of aid has already been envisaged for REDD activities under the GCF. It has already 
been experimented by the World Bank, but on a limited project scale, and by the Energy+ 
partnership. Similar proposals have been made for the GCF (Müller, 2013; Michaelowa and 
Hoch, 2013). Instruments of this sort are an additional incentive for achieving goals (Eichler 
and Levine, 2009; Mumssen et al., 2010). 
As in the Green Climate Fund modalities aiming at enhancing ownership of actions, the PAM-
W would have no mandate to discuss a country’s specific strategy for carrying out actions 
and helping to improve the standard of living of its population, this being a matter of 
national sovereignty. Only results would be observed. The revenue contributed by the PAM-
W and covered by an ex post guarantee could be used to leverage project funding. 
e) Modalities of support and country ownership of actions 
The PAM-W will be able to fund, without distinction, a subsidy on the total value of 
infrastructure investments, a subsidy on usage costs (funding of a feed-in tariff scheme such 
as the one proposed by Michaelowa and Hoch (2013), for example) or other types of aid. 
Similarly countries must be free to decide how actions should be funded: out of their own 
assets, through private domestic or foreign investment, or from development aid. In view of 
the huge amount of funding required to cope with the challenges of adaptation and 
mitigation in developing countries, and the likelihood of only limited financial resources 
being available under the GCF, the modalities of support for these countries must limit as far 
as possible any windfall effects. As investigated by Khan and Schinn (2013), or Michaelowa 
and Hoch (2013), specific financial-support modalities will be applied as a function of each 
                                                     
8 The GCF mentions the option of results-based funding (GCF, 2011, §59; GCF, 2014e). 
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country’s national income (based on the typology used by the World Bank) (see Table 3). 
Additional conditions may be set to demonstrate that a country is seriously committed to 
the paradigm shift which the GCF must entail, and/or regarding the need for co-funding, in 
particular from private sources, for lower and upper middle-income countries. For low-
income countries, co-funding by public development aid, or conventional public or private 
funding will be needed. Moreover setting such conditions will favour country ownership of 
actions, as well as increase scope for direct access to PAM-W funding. 
Table 3: modalities of PAM-W support depending on a country’s category 
 Small-island 
states 
Low-income 
countries 
Lower middle-
income 
countries 
Upper middle-
income 
countries 
Mitigation Donations Donations Concessional 
loans & 
donations (30%) 
Concessional 
loans 
Adaptation Donations Donations Donations Concessional 
loans 
III. Conclusion 
Existing climate funds have difficulty providing a suitable response to the specific demands 
of the poorest populations with regard to climate-change adaptation and mitigation. To fill 
the gap this article proposes setting up a specific funding window for poverty, adaptation 
and mitigation as part of the Green Climate Fund. 
One of the key features of the PAM-W is that it bases the criteria for selecting and assessing 
actions to be funded on the satisfaction of sectoral basic needs and their change after 
completion of the actions. By setting a level of aid proportionate to the number of 
beneficiaries, the mechanism avoids the need to discuss baseline scenarios, thus limiting 
transaction costs. The talks to decide the level of aid and funding modalities will certainly be 
very difficult. Defining “access to basic needs” and monitoring results may also raise 
methodological issues, but it is important that they do not dramatically raise transaction 
costs. An assessment of the overall amount of financial needs for the PAM-W to be 
consistent with SDGs is also needed. Additional research on these topics will be driven.  
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The principle of the right to development is central to this proposition, in that it targets the 
satisfaction of populations’ basic needs. It defines a country continuum, given that there are 
poor people everywhere; all developing countries are therefore eligible with a mechanism of 
this sort, subject to funding modalities dependent on their income level. 
Lastly the PAM-W responds, at least in part, to the demands of developing countries, for 
whom eradicating poverty is the prime objective. As such it could contribute to overcoming 
some of the obstacles holding up talks in international climate negotiations. In the run-up to 
the next round of negotiations at COP 21 in Paris, the PAM-W could spur developing 
countries to integrate more ambitious emissions limitations pledges into their Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions. This could in turn entice industrialized countries to act 
similarly. In the end, it could pave the way to an ambitious climate agreement. 
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